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Multiparty Joinder and Venue: How 
Missouri is Acting Against Historic 
Procedural Law Principles in an Effort to 
Curb Forum Shopping 
State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson v. Burlison, 567 S.W.3d 168 (Mo. banc 2019). 
Jackson Gilkey* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Missouri has a problem.  St. Louis City has become such a haven for 
plaintiffs to achieve easy victories with large awards that Missouri courts are 
now considered the second-worst forum by businesses for litigation.1  State 
ex rel. Johnson & Johnson v. Burlison attempted to fix this problem by 
requiring stricter application of joinder and venue statutes.  But, in doing so, 
the Missouri Supreme Court and Legislature are acting against the historical 
and philosophical underpinnings of procedural law.  Rather than trying to fix 
the substantive issues for why plaintiffs would rather bring their cases in this 
state, this decision instead makes it harder for any and all plaintiffs to join in 
a lawsuit, even if it is most efficient to do so.  Missouri is treating its 
symptoms, not curing its disease.  By choosing the easy way out and 
abandoning the historical development of procedural law, Missouri residents 
may find it highly difficult or impossible to resolve their disputes arising in a 
modern world. 
In 2014, dozens of plaintiffs joined in a single suit against Johnson & 
Johnson, alleging that its talc powder caused them to develop ovarian cancer.2  
Although the lawsuit was filed in St. Louis City, only some of the plaintiffs 
 
* B.S.Ch.E, University of Missouri, 2018; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2021; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2019–2020.  I am 
grateful to Professor Dennis Crouch for his insight, guidance, and support during the 
writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing 
process. 
 1. Missouri Lawmakers Vote to Limit Some Civil Lawsuits, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(May 2, 2019), https://apnews.com/bbb3e96387c847979f8476f927e854a3 [perma.cc/ 
LJ8J-AUDV]. 
 2. State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson v. Burlison, 567 S.W.3d 168 (Mo. 2019) (en 
banc). 
1
Gilkey: Multiparty Joinder and Venue: How Missouri is Acting Against Hist
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
526 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
were residents or were first injured there.3  Both the Circuit Court of the City 
of St. Louis and the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, refused to 
sever a party for improper venue.4  However, the Missouri Supreme Court 
ultimately reversed and held that permissive joinder rules do not extend to 
allow joinder of plaintiffs that cannot independently establish venue.5  The 
majority emphasized that venue must be considered independently as a 
prerequisite to joinder.6  Two dissenting judges focused on the statutory 
language of the Missouri venue and joinder statutes and concluded that the 
permissive joinder statute is broad enough to allow a case to proceed in a 
particular court so long as one of the parties meet the venue requirements and 
the other claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.7  After the 
case was decided, the Missouri Legislature explicitly adopted the case into the 
permissive joinder statute, enshrining the holding of the majority.8 
This Note highlights the danger in Missouri’s approach to procedural 
reform and offers an alternative method for thinking through the undeniable 
problems the state faces.  It begins by discussing the underlying facts and 
holding of Burlison in Part II.  Then, Part III summarizes the development of 
modern joinder and venue law, including the philosophical shifts from early 
common law to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
their implementation by Missouri statute.  Part IV examines the reasoning 
behind the majority and two dissenting opinions in Burlison.  Finally, Part V 
compares the net result of current procedural jurisprudence with the 
underlying principles evident in the development of procedural law and offer 
some examples of substantive solutions to the problem.  
This Note discusses how this holding matches the nation-wide trend 
toward limiting the ability of multiple parties to bring their claims in a single 
action, cutting against the purposes behind the historical development of 
joinder and venue rules.  Though the resources of the court system would 
arguably be most efficiently utilized by liberal joinder rules, modern 
legislative bodies have adopted much legislation aiming to reduce the ability 
of plaintiffs’ attorneys to participate in forum shopping and create quasi-class 
actions.9  Further, this decision will almost certainly achieve a similar effect 
of other tort reform measures in making it more difficult for individual 
plaintiffs to bring suit if their individual damages are not high enough and 
curbing the disparity of where multiparty lawsuits occur.  
On the other hand, the holding cuts against the rationale behind modern 
party joinder rules and will likely have unintended consequences such as 
 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. at 169–70. 
 5. Id. at 171. 
 6. Id. at 171–72. 
 7. Id. at 176–90 (Draper III, J. and Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 8. MO. REV. STAT. § 507.040 (2018) (“The general assembly hereby expressly 
adopts the holding of State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson v. Burlison, No. SC96704, as 
issued on February 13, 2019, as it relates to joinder and venue.”). 
 9. See infra Part III.B. 
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straining smaller courts not used to handling these sorts of claims.  Further, 
by reverting to geographic requirements for venue rather than focusing on 
dispute resolution efficiency, the ability of courts to resolve ever-evolving 
disputes with less and less ties to geography in an efficient manner will be 
greatly inhibited.  This Note ultimately concludes that, while there are genuine 
concerns regarding issues of forum shopping, the solution should not and 
cannot be merely closing the courthouse doors. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Johnson & Johnson manufactures and sells, among other things, body 
powder that contains talc.10  In 2014, multiple plaintiffs brought suit in the 
Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis against Johnson & Johnson, alleging that 
the company’s talc-based powder caused the users to develop ovarian 
cancer.11  The plaintiffs sought relief under various state law tort theories, 
including strict liability for failure to warn, breach of warranty, negligent 
misrepresentation, and others.12 
In Missouri, procedural law is found within both rules promulgated by 
the Missouri Supreme Court  and statutes enacted by the legislature.  At issue 
in this case are: (1) the permissive joinder statute, (2) the court rule, and (3) 
the relevant venue statute.  The statute and the rule regarding permissive 
joinder are essentially identical, allowing for claims to be joined if they arise 
“out of the same transaction or occurrence.”13  Importantly, both are written 
broadly, with little mention of venue.14  By contrast, the venue statute is 
written very narrowly, providing exact requirements to establish venue for 
different categories of cases.15 
Johnson & Johnson moved to sever the parties and transfer venue as only 
one plaintiff, Valerie Swann, was a resident of St. Louis City.16  The company 
argued that the parties were improperly joined under Missouri Rule of Civil 
Procedure (“MRCP”) 52.05(a).17  The circuit court rejected this argument, 
finding that severance was not required because the only requirement for 
permissive joinder of parties is that similar issues of law and fact arose out of 
the “same transaction or occurrence.”18  
However, things became muddled once another plaintiff, Michael Blaes, 
attempted to join the lawsuit in 2016.19  Blaes claimed that his deceased wife 
 
 10. Burlison, S.W.3d at 170. 
 11. Id. at 169. 
 12. Id. at 169–70 (other causes of action included civil conspiracy, concert of 
action, fraud, and wrongful death). 
 13. MO. REV. STAT. § 507.040 (2018); MO. R. CIV. P. 52.05. 
 14. See § 507.040; MO. R. CIV. P. 52.05. 
 15. See § 508.010. 
 16. Burlison, 567 S.W.3d at 170. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.  
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had contracted ovarian cancer from using the talc powder.20  They resided in 
St. Louis County when they bought the talc powder, she used the talc powder 
in St. Louis County, and they bought the talc powder from a business in St. 
Louis County.21  In response, Johnson & Johnson filed a motion for severance 
and transfer for lack of jurisdiction and venue once the court designated 
Blaes’s claim for a separate trial.22  This motion was denied.23  Then, the 
defendants sought a writ of prohibition from the circuit court to prevent the 
joint case from moving forward, 24 which was denied by the Eastern District 
of Missouri.25  The defendants then sought a writ of prohibition from the 
Missouri Supreme Court, which granted a preliminary writ before issuing its 
order.26 
The Missouri Supreme Court held a writ of prohibition was proper 
because the venue statutes require that plaintiffs bring tort claims in the county 
where they were first injured and any joinder rule that would allow Blaes to 
be joined with the other plaintiffs absent venue being proper for Blaes himself 
would be an improper application of the rules of civil procedure.27  The 
majority opinion emphasized that principles of venue must be considered 
independently from considerations of permissive joinder.28  No longer may 
parties join so long as they satisfy permissive joinder’s “same transaction or 
occurrence” test regardless of whether each plaintiff satisfies, or does not 
satisfy, the requirements of the venue statute.29  If any plaintiff does not satisfy 
the venue requirements, his or her claim should be severed.30 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Burlison is part of a trend across the country making it more difficult for 
multiple plaintiffs to join in a single lawsuit arising from the same alleged 
misconduct of a single defendant.  This Section outlines the concepts of 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 171.  Unlike a writ of mandamus, where a party is seeking a higher 
court to order a lower court to take an action, a writ of prohibition seeks to stop a court 
from doing something it is about to do. Id.  In this context, it would be sought to stop 
a court from allowing a party to be joined to a case when the opposing party argues 
the court has no ability to do so for lack of venue. Id.  Thus, it avoids issues of undue 
prejudice under Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 84.13(b) by answering questions of 
joinder preemptively rather than only taking up the issue after the merits of the case 
have been decided. Id. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 170–71. 
 27. Id. at 177. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 180. 
 30. Id. at 177–78. 
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joinder and venue as they have existed traditionally, as well as the 
developments that led to the modern framework. 
A.  Historical Development of Joinder from Common Law to the 
Modern Rules 
Early common-law procedure was grounded in a rights-centered view.31  
This view focused on identifying substantive rights and obligations.  For 
plaintiffs, joinder was allowed when multiple parties had at least some 
dominion over a substantive right.32  Conversely, defendants could be joined 
only when they shared a duty over that plaintiff’s or plaintiffs’ substantive 
right(s).33  If two parties were viewed as “joint” owners of a substantive right, 
they were required to bring suit together.34  But, if the rights were “several” 
rather than “joint,” each individual owner of the right would have to bring his 
or her claim in a separate proceeding because each of their interests could be 
viewed as separate from the other.35  A similar exercise would be conducted 
to determine the “joint” or “several” status of an obligation.36  If the obligation 
was joint, the defendants were required to be joined.37  If the obligation was 
several, the defendants could be joined, but it was not required.38  These 
concepts led to the distinction between permissive and compulsory joinder.39 
Unlike the rigid rights and obligations analysis of the courts of law, 
common-law courts of equity employed a much more liberal concept of 
joinder.40  Instead of focusing the analysis on whether something was held 
severally or jointly, equity’s aim was “to have in court all persons whose rights 
or property are involved in any particular litigation and to render a complete 
decree adjusting all the rights and protecting all the parties against future 
litigations.”41  This liberal approach allowed for complicated controversies to 
be packaged into a single litigation unavailable in courts of law and opened 
the courthouse doors to previously unknown categories of cases and 
plaintiffs.42  
 
 31. Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of the Dispute: Conceptions of 
Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to The Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 7 (1989). 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.   
 36. Id. at 8.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 9. 
 40. Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort 
Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 281 (1991). 
 41. Id. at 281–82. 
 42. Id. at 282. 
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This joinder mechanism dramatically changed as the legal world shifted 
from a rights-centered to a right-remedy point of view.43  The right-remedy 
legal framework began by establishing a foundational cornerstone of some 
primary “right.”44  The legal system’s job was to determine the character of 
and relationship between the various “rights.”45  Therefore, rather than the 
legal remedy being grounded in concepts of violation of an obligation, 
remedies were viewed as derivative rights of the primary “right.”46  While 
seemingly metaphysical and semantic, this change in legal philosophy led to 
a fundamental shift: no longer were remedies modeled after an obligation, but 
remedies were designed to shift the legal equilibrium back to the natural state 
where the “right” holder did not have his or her “right” violated.47  Remedies, 
in a sense, were viewed as a legal homeostasis, being specifically crafted to 
do whatever was needed to place the “right” holder back in the state of nature 
without infringement.48   
Under this theory, procedural law served as the second derivative of the 
primary “right.”49  Just as the remedy was specifically designed to protect the 
“right,” the procedure was designed to achieve the remedy.50  Because joinder 
is a subset of procedural law, the rules of joinder were designed to facilitate 
seeking a remedy that would fully protect the “right.”51  If the proper remedy 
required many parties to be joined, the parties would be joined.52  As this legal 
framework began to take hold in the nineteenth century, many jurists began 
to favor the joinder rules of courts of equity, as the rigid approach of the law 
courts would sometimes serve as an insurmountable obstacle to achieving an 
appropriate remedy.53  This also granted courts the ability to properly 
adjudicate issues of growing complexity in an evolving world.54 
This shift in philosophy led to the adoption of the first codified rules of 
procedure: the New York Field Code (“the Field Code”).55  The Field Code 
eliminated the division between courts of law and equity, abolishing the 
highly specific requirements of common law writs that had developed over 
time.56  Additionally, the Field Code adopted the more liberal standards of 
 
 43. Bone, supra note 31, at 10–12. 
 44. Id. at 12.  
 45. Id. at 13.  
 46. Id. at 12–13. 
 47. Id. at 8–9. 
 48. Id. at 17.  
 49. Id. at 15.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 22.  
 52. Id.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
 55. An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of 
the Courts of this State, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497. 
 56. Bone, supra note 31, at 10. 
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joinder found in courts of equity, leaving behind the highly technical 
questions of “joint” and “several” ownership found within courts of law.57 
The philosophical ideas underlying the Field Code would ultimately lead 
to rules outlining an enigmatic approach seeking to identify an ideal procedure 
to obtain an ideal remedy for an infringed right.58  Necessarily, the joinder 
rules had to be extensively broad to incorporate any potential plaintiff or 
defendant required to obtain the platonic procedure.59  “All persons having an 
interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded,” 
could be joined as plaintiffs.60  Similarly, “Any person may be made a 
defendant, who has or claims an interest in the controversy, adverse to the 
plaintiff, or who is a necessary party to complete determination or settlement 
of the question.”61 
After enactment of the Field Code, the next evolutionary stage for 
procedural law was the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“the FRCP”) in 1938.62  The FRCP, in general, retained the flexibility favored 
by the Field Code and traditional courts of equity over the rigidity of common-
law joinder rules, but they also sought to provide more definite, workable 
standards instead of the mysterious tests of the right-remedy jurisprudence.63  
The focus shifted to a much more pragmatic approach, aiming to promote 
“litigation packaging” to avoid inefficiencies of trying multiple cases over 
equivalent issues.64  Under the FRCP, a suit was no longer conceptualized as 
pitting rights against obligations or as seeking the ideal remedy to restore the 
holder of a right back to the position he or she would be in absent infringement 
of that right; the scope of a suit was now determined along transactional 
lines.65  If a party was involved in the relevant “transaction or occurrence,” he 
or she could be properly joined in the suit.66  The “transaction or occurrence” 
test still survives in modern permissive joinder rules.67 
 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 46–47. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 47 (citations omitted). 
 61. Id. (citations omitted). 
 62. Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure 
Federal Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061, 1065–67 (1985). 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 1067. 
 66. Id.  
 67. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (“Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if: (A) 
they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or 
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences; and (B)  any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in 
the action.”); see also MO. R. CIV. P. 52.05(a) (“All persons may join in one action as 
plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in 
respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions 
or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in 
the action.”). 
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Missouri’s historical development of civil procedure closely mirrored 
that which was occurring on the national level.68  In fact, Missouri has 
traditionally been a leader in the civil procedure realm.69  Missouri adopted 
the Field Code in 1849, just one year after the Code’s original enactment in 
New York.70  Missouri was also one of the first states to establish a system of 
rules based on the FRCP.71  Generally, Missouri’s development of procedural 
law perfectly tracks the national development, including the fundamental goal 
to “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.”72 
B.  The Interplay of Modern Joinder Rules with Venue and 
Jurisdiction 
The FRCP represented the pragmatic theory of joinder winning out over 
either version of the rights-based theory of legal claims.  Modern joinder rules 
reflect a willingness to defer to the experts of trial efficiency – the trial court 
– to determine when the operative facts are so similar that judicial economy 
is best served by allowing many parties to join in a single suit.73  The purpose 
behind the rules is to promote trial convenience and expedient resolution of 
the relative disputes.74  Granting the trial court this discretion also helps 
prevent multiple, repetitive lawsuits.75 
The modern formulation of joinder rules does not give trial courts 
complete discretion in issues of joinder.  Instead, the FRCP provide that 
joinder may not be used to extend jurisdiction or venue over a party where it 
would otherwise be lacking.76  Jurisdiction and venue each have their own 
complicated historical development.77  Because this will be discussed in 
further detail later in this Note, a simple statement of the difference between 
joinder, jurisdiction, and venue will suffice.  Jurisdiction is the requirement 
that a tribunal must have power over the individual against whom the lawsuit 
is brought; venue is the requirement that a tribunal is the proper arena for the 
 
 68. Joseph J. Simeone, Approaches to Teaching Civil Procedure: Reflections on 
Fifty Years of Teaching Civil Procedure, 47 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 87, 87 (2003). 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.  
 72. MO. R. CIV. P. 41.03; FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 73. Mary Kay Kane, Permissive Joinder of Parties under Rule 20(a) – Purpose 
and Scope, 7 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1652 (Wright & Miller eds., 3d ed. 2019). 
 74. See League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 
914, 917 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 75. Id.  
 76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 82 (“These rules do not extend or limit the jurisdiction of 
the district courts or the venue of actions in those courts.”); see also MO. R. CIV. P. 
51.01 (“These Rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the 
courts of Missouri, or the venue of civil actions therein.”). 
 77. See infra Part V.A. 
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dispute to be adjudicated.78  Jurisdiction and venue, therefore, are a required 
relationship between the court and the parties, whereas joinder requires a 
relationship between parties with a similar interest.79  Therefore, just because 
a sufficient relationship between parties can be established does not 
necessarily mean that a relationship between the parties and the court is 
established.  As an example of this interplay, the ability of federal district 
courts to allow permissive joinder over plaintiffs that would otherwise fail to 
satisfy diversity jurisdiction requirements80 has been a difficult problem 
without a clear answer.81 
While the requirement that jurisdiction and venue be satisfied 
independent of permissive joinder was grounded in the text of the FRCP, the 
implementation of independent inquiries seemed to cut against much of the 
reasoning for allowing liberal joinder of parties in the first instance.82  The 
ability for jurisdictional requirements to almost completely restrict the joinder 
rules from realizing the efficiencies they were designed to enable led to the 
enactment of such legislation as the Mutliparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction 
Act of 2002.83  Even then, however, substantial limitations were implemented 
to ensure that it only applied to a small fraction of cases.84  A district court 
will only be granted original jurisdiction involving minimum diversity if the 
case involves a single accident, at least seventy-five people died, and one of 
three requirements are met: (1) a defendant resides in a state different than the 
state where the accident occurred; (2) “two defendants reside in different 
states; or (3) substantial parts of the accident took place in different states.”85 
Notably, Missouri has not been nearly as willing to enact legislation 
allowing for multiparty cases, likely due to the tort reform movement.86  
Beginning in the 1980s, Missouri leaders and legislators began to join a chorus 
of individuals calling for drastic changes to the tort system.87  Specifically, 
 
 78. See infra Part V.A. 
 79. See infra Part V.A. 
 80. In order for federal courts to hear cases regarding state law between two 
parties, the plaintiff and defendant must be citizens of different states, and the amount 
in controversy must exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2018). 
 81. See, e.g., Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (holding that each 
individual plaintiff must meet the $75,000 amount in controversy threshold before 
being allowed to join under rule 20); but see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 570 (2005) (overturning Zahn on the grounds that supplemental 
jurisdiction allows for the joinder of parties so long as the same transaction or 
occurrence test has been satisfied and at least one plaintiff meets the $75,000 
threshold). 
 82. See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: 
Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7 (1986). 
 83. See 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2018). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Barbara A. Geisman, Reform or Reshuffle? Consequences of the 2005 
Missouri Tort Reform Act, 42 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 155, 156 (2013). 
 87. Id. at 158.  
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there was growing concern that both the number of lawsuits and size of 
damage awards resulting from product liability, toxic tort, and medical 
malpractice cases were becoming excessive and unsustainable.88  Plaintiffs’ 
attorneys were able to utilize expansive interpretations of old venue rules to 
creatively and strategically establish venue in counties that were traditionally 
known to be more plaintiff-friendly or to  award higher amounts of punitive 
damages.89  Proponents of tort reform thought that corporations would either 
not be able to continue operating within Missouri, or they would be 
disincentivized from bringing their businesses to this state.90  It was the 
reformers’ view that Missouri businesses would continue to be unjustly, or at 
least disproportionately, punished unless changes were made regarding 
damage caps or procedural requirements.91 
The most relevant tort reform effort for purposes of this Note is the new 
standard for determining proper venue.  Under the new venue statutes enacted 
by the Missouri Tort Reform Act92 in 2005, venue in a tort action is proper 
only in the county where the plaintiff was first injured by the alleged acts or 
conduct.93  For purposes of determining where a plaintiff was first injured, the 
inquiry is directed at the initial place of trauma or exposure rather than the 
first location where symptoms are manifested.94  And because the new venue 
rules were rather straightforward in their implementation, it became more and 
more difficult to bring a tort action in a county not contemplated by the plain 
language of the venue statute.95 
State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson v. Burlison, then, arises from a complex 
legal history.  On one hand, the long-term development of joinder concepts 
has invariably tended to side with the more expansive principles of the courts 
of equity over the narrower courts of law.  On the other hand, Missouri’s 
recent history shows a level of disdain for abstract principles of venue and 
jurisdiction.  Missouri, instead, chooses to rely on bright-line tests to ensure 
fairness and justice, thereby barring plaintiffs from using procedural tools to 
gain strategic advantages.  While the right-remedy mode of thought was 
ultimately rejected in favor of the pragmatists who designed our modern civil 
procedure rules, the principles of joinder are still grounded in trying to 
maximize judicial efficiency while trying to obtain an appropriate remedy for 
 
 88. Id. at 164–65, 178. 
 89. See Craig A. Adoor & Joseph J. Simeone, The Law of Venue in Missouri, 32 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 639, 642 (1988); see also Darin P. Shreves, Counselor, Stop 
Everything – Missouri’s Venue Statutes Receive an Expansive Interpretation, 75 MO. 
L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2010). 
 90. Geisman, supra note 86, at 158 (noting that Missouri’s United States Senator 
John C. Danforth even “launched into a tirade on the senate floor against some lawyers 
who specialize in products-liability lawsuits.”). 
 91. Id.  
 92. H.B. 393, 93d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Session (Mo. 2005). 
 93. MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.4 (2018). 
 94. § 508.010.14. 
 95. Geisman, supra note 86, at 158.  
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss2/9
2020] MULTIPARTY JOINDER AND VENUE 535 
an alleged infringement.  Burlison represents a crossroads between pragmatic 
packaging of disputes to most efficiently litigate relevant factual and legal 
issues and a legislative intent to curb multiparty litigation fervor in the 
friendliest of venues.  
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
Against the factual and historical backdrop, the Missouri Supreme Court 
ultimately had to decide one issue: does meeting the requirements of 
permissive joinder remove questions of proper venue or must venue be 
satisfied before a party can be properly joined? 
A.  Judge Powell’s Majority Opinion 
The majority opinion, written by Judge W. Brent Powell, focused on 
MRCP language that restricts the ability of the rules to extend venue via a rule 
where venue would otherwise be improper.96  Under the joinder statute, the 
only way Blaes could establish venue was for him to be permissively joined 
with other plaintiffs who were properly within the St. Louis City venue.97  The 
permissive joinder rule could not be used to bring him into the case, however, 
because he had no independent basis for venue because he was first injured 
St. Louis County.98  The majority noted that MRCP 51.01 mandates that the 
MRCP could not be used to extend jurisdiction or venue over a party where 
either would otherwise be lacking.99   
The majority did not solely rely on statutory interpretation to arrive at its 
conclusion; it also found that Missouri case law supported its finding.100  The 
majority analogized to its earlier holding in State ex rel. Turnbough v. 
Gaertner, finding that permissive joinder may not be used to establish venue 
when each claim would not, independently, satisfy venue requirements.101  
The court then turned to the plaintiff’s other argument that the recent decision 
 
 96. State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson v. Burlison, 567 S.W.3d 168, 171 (Mo. 2019) 
(en banc); MO. R. CIV. P. 51.01 (“These Rules shall not be construed to extend or limit 
the jurisdiction of the courts of Missouri, or the venue of civil actions therein.”). 
 97. Burlison, 567 S.W.3d at 171. 
 98. Id. at 173.  
 99. Id. at 172.  
 100. Id. at 173.  
 101. 589 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).  In Turnbough, a plaintiff brought 
personal injury claims against two separate defendants, but the plaintiff chose to bring 
both claims in a single action in St. Louis City. Id. at 290.  But the venue was only 
proper over one of the claims. Id. at 291.  Also, relying on the language of 51.01, the 
Turnbough court held that venue was not properly had over the other claim, as 
permissive joinder could not extend venue where it would not otherwise be proper. Id. 
at 291–92. 
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of State ex rel. Kinsey v. Wilkins102 invalidated the holding of Turnbough.103  
The majority found that the Kinsey decision was merely an application of the 
place of first injury principle, the very principle that Blaes failed to satisfy.104  
Therefore, the plaintiff’s argument failed, and the Circuit Court of the City of 
St. Louis was not the proper venue for Blaes’s claim.105 
B.  Judge Draper’s Dissent 
The first dissent, written by Judge George W. Draper III, focused on the 
fact that the majority opinion’s analysis – that the joinder rule cannot 
independently create venue when otherwise unavailable – ignores the 
language of the relevant statutes and rules.106   
First, the dissent argued the joinder rule itself is actually a direct copy 
from a joinder statute and therefore has just as much legal power as any other 
statute.107  It does not receive a lesser level of influence than the venue 
statute.108  Because both statutes utilize the language “notwithstanding other 
provisions of law,” neither may counteract the other, and permissive joinder 
should be allowed if the same transaction or occurrence test is satisfied.109  
Essentially, under Judge Draper’s view, venue and permissive joinder operate 
independently from each other, and neither may be used to invalidate the 
other.110 
The dissent contended that the majority opinion cited factually 
inapposite cases, as they involved a plaintiff suing multiple defendants.111  
Specifically, Judge Draper emphasized that in State ex rel. Jinkerson v. Koehr, 
the court held that joinder was improper because the same transaction or 
occurrence test was not satisfied.112  It was not the case that venue had to be 
satisfied first before a joinder analysis could be performed; the joinder 
requirements, in that case, simply were not met.113  According to the dissent, 
 
 102. 394 S.W.3d 446 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).  Kinsey involved a plaintiff who was 
injured by two, successive automobile accidents where the plaintiff sustained injuries 
to the same parts of his body from both accidents. Id. at 447–48.  The plaintiff in that 
case brought a consolidated action against both defendants in the county where the 
first accident occurred. Id.  That court found venue was proper in the county where 
the first accident occurred because, “Section 508.010.4 confers venue for separate, yet 
successive automobile accidents occurring in different counties, in the county of first 
injury.” Id. at 453. 
 103. Burlison, 567 S.W.3d at 173–74. 
 104. Id. at 174.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 176–83 (Draper, J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. at 176.  
 108. Id. at 178; MO. REV. STAT. § 507.040 (2018); MO. R. CIV. P. 52.05. 
 109. Burlison, 567 S.W.3d at 180–81 (Draper, J., dissenting). 
 110. See id. at 180. 
 111. Id. at 176.  
 112. Id. at 182. 
 113. Id. 
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Jinkerson was not a case about the interplay of joinder and venue but rather a 
case that turned on the application of joinder alone.114  Finally, the facts that 
led to joinder not being satisfied were the same facts that failed to satisfy the 
venue requirements.115 
Beyond the factual differences of the cited authority with the current 
case, Judge Draper also did not agree with the majority’s reading of the venue 
statute.116  Specifically, Judge Draper did not believe that the post-tort-reform 
venue provisions provided an answer as to where venue lies in a case where 
multiple plaintiffs could at least initially be joined after meeting MRCP 
52.05(a)’s joinder requirements.117  Further, the cases most relied on by the 
majority were dealing with the older version of the venue statute.118  Without 
appropriate authority, and without any statutory provision directly on point, 
Judge Draper could not find any venue grounds to sever an otherwise properly 
joined party.119 
C.  Judge Wilson’s Dissent 
Judge Paul C. Wilson’s opinion disagreed with the majority from a 
different angle.  Rather than grounding his discussion in whether permissive 
joinder could override venue deficiencies for individual plaintiffs, Judge 
Wilson believed that the venue requirements themselves had been satisfied.120   
First, Judge Wilson noted that the language of the statute only requires a 
single claim in the case to have the original injury occur in the county where 
venue is sought.121  In Judge Wilson’s view, the statute’s use of the word 
“claim” instead of “action” was relevant to how it should be interpreted, and 
the drafters would have understood this fundamental difference.122  Under the 
majority’s reasoning, the venue requirements would extend to every 
individual claim in the action, a result that cuts against the plain language of 
the statute.123  Therefore, when parties are joined properly – so long as one 
claim from at least one party meets the venue requirement – the other claims, 
including those filed by other parties, cannot be severed for a lack of venue.124 
Notably, Judge Wilson completely agreed with the majority opinion that 
venue and permissive joinder operate as independent functions rather than one 
begetting the other.125  Unlike the theoretical structure of Judge Draper’s 
 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 183.  
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 182.  
 119. Id. at 183.  
 120. Id. at 183–90 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 184.  
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. at 184–85. 
 124. Id. at 186–87. 
 125. Id. at 188.  
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dissent, Judge Wilson’s reasoning was grounded in a definition of venue that 
only becomes lax once permissive joinder is satisfied.126  If Blaes could not 
be joined under the MRCP, he would not satisfy the venue requirements, but 
the venue requirements only mandate that a single claim of the entire action 
be in compliance.127  So, while Judge Wilson agreed with the majority’s 
underlying reasoning and only differed on issues of statutory interpretation, 
his mode of conceptualizing venue would necessarily require that the court 
first allow for joinder to see if any one of the individual claims can meet the 
venue requirements.128 
D.  Subsequent Legislative Action 
If there was ever a chance that the reasoning of either dissenting opinion 
could eventually become controlling law in a later decision, it was quickly 
quashed by the Missouri Legislature.  Effective August 18, 2019, the Missouri 
Legislature amended Section 507.040 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri – 
the section relating to permissive joinder – to adopt the majority’s view that 
permissive joinder could not be used to establish venue when additional 
plaintiffs could not independently satisfy the requirement.129  Because the 
amended statute makes clear that it adopts the holding both as it relates to 
joinder and venue, it also eliminates any ability of the Supreme Court to 
reconsider whether Judge Wilson’s interpretation of the venue statute is 
correct.130 
V.  COMMENT 
State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson v. Burlison seems to be another victory 
for the tort reform movement that has proven so influential in Missouri over 
the past several decades.  But, just as the original implementation of the FRCP 
came at a time where the traditional common law writ system or the newly 
implemented field codes proved ineffective in addressing the evolving legal 
disputes of the industrial and post-war eras, this case may serve as an example 
of how advances in technology and communication have left us in a new legal 
landscape.  In this new landscape, the traditional rules of venue and 
jurisdiction improperly restrict what would otherwise be the most logical and 
efficient packaging of factual and legal disputes to be resolved in a way that 
most fits the rationale behind the implementation of the FRCP in the first 
place.  This Section aims to place this case holding within the context of an 
 
 126. Id. at 189–90. 
 127. Id. at 190.  
 128. Id.  
 129. MO. REV. STAT. § 507.040.2 (2018) (“The general assembly hereby expressly 
adopts the holding of State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson v. Burlison, No. SC96704, as 
issued on February 13, 2019, as it relates to joinder and venue.”). 
 130. Id. 
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increasingly heightened obstacle to dispute packaging to evaluate the future 
ramifications of the holding. 
A.  The Increasing Meaninglessness of Geography Calls for Liberal 
Joinder Application 
Part II outlined how the legal world developed from highly technical 
requirements for joinder all the way to the modern rules.  Implicit within that 
development was a fundamental need to create a procedural system that could 
adapt to a world that was scientifically developing faster than the court 
system’s ability to create new writs.131  However, while the FRCP had to 
change the mechanism for which party joinder was evaluated to match the 
legal needs of modern society, the technological advancements of that era did 
not necessitate an entire rethinking of concepts of jurisdiction or venue.132  For 
this reason, FRCP 84 – and its Missouri counterpart upon which the majority 
in Burlison based its decision – prohibited joinder rules from extending 
jurisdiction or venue when either could not be independently established.133   
But, studying the historical development of questions of venue and 
jurisdiction leads to the conclusion that novel rules will need to be developed 
if modern disputes are to ever be effectively litigated.  Early concepts of 
personal jurisdiction were focused on whether a court physically had the 
ability to enforce a judgment against the plaintiff – the court must have some 
control over either the person or that person’s property.134  This was 
intrinsically tied to the geography of any jurisdictional body, as the only 
situation where jurisdiction could extend beyond a state’s borders was if the 
defendant was found and served in the jurisdiction.135 
Venue’s historical development is even more intrinsically tied to 
geography.  At English common law, venue had to be proximate to the 
location where the acts or conduct of a lawsuit occurred because of stringent 
requirements that jurors have personal knowledge of the events.136  As the 
legal world evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, venue was still 
mostly associated with finding a forum where the a defendant resided or could 
be found.137  One of the earliest hurdles of these concepts of venue and 
jurisdiction was with regard to corporations, as it was not as intuitive to 
 
 131. Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 40, at 279. 
 132. Bone, supra note 31, at 8–9. 
 133. FED. R. CIV. P. 84; MO. R. CIV. P. 51.01. 
 134. See, e.g., McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91–92 (1917) (“The foundation 
of jurisdiction is physical power . . . the ground for giving subsequent effect to a 
judgment is that the court rendering it had acquired power to carry it out . . . .”). 
 135. See, e.g., Louisville, C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497, 530–31 (1844); 
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 528 (1839). 
 136. E. Lawrence Vincent, Defining ‘Doing Business’ to Determine Corporate 
Venue, 65 TEX. L. REV. 153, 156 (1986). 
 137. Id. at 157.  
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determine where some sort of legal construct “resided.”138  Even with the 
development of corporate venue, courts still rooted the discussion of these 
topics in concepts of geography, aiming to identify the state of incorporation, 
the nerve center of the company, and any state with sufficient contacts to 
establish residency.139 
 “The times they are a changin’.”140  Every day, advances in technology 
cause the world to shrink.141  Technological advancements have made it 
possible for communications across the entire planet to be made at the speed 
of light.142  Transportation technology has given normal individuals the ability 
to make the treks of humankind’s greatest explorers in a fraction of the time 
with a fraction of the skill of those expeditioners.143  Gone are the days where 
individuals are restricted to only communicating with those who reside within 
the same county, state, or national border.144  Even mundane forms of modern 
communication have the ability to reach far beyond the geographic scope of 
the jurisdiction where one resides.145 
Whether this advancement in technology is an overall benefit for society 
is outside the scope of this Note.  Rather, the importance of technological 
advances lies within the very foundational ideas of venue and jurisdiction that 
so frequently serve as checks to the liberal policy of permissive joinder.  As 
most scholars maintained when implementing the FRCP in the early twentieth 
century, consolidation of claims and parties into a single suit could greatly 
increase the efficiency of the court system, thereby making all the relevant 
parties better off.146  While the pursuit of a platonic procedure was rightfully 
abandoned for considerations of pragmatism, the underlying theory guiding 
the rules of joinder calls for these rules to be flexible enough to adapt to 
whatever changes modernity may bring.147  
Unlike in the 1930s, the disputes of the modern world are not likely to 
fit neatly within geographic boundaries.  Just how the FRCP adjusted the 
procedural approach to accommodate the declining two-party model of 
resolving legal disputes, so too should the modern joinder rules allow for the 
packaging of parties and claims that may not naturally conform to hundred-
year-old conceptions of jurisdiction and venue.  Yet, not only have the last 
two decades shown a lack of progress in expanding the bounds of joinder, but 
 
 138. See id.  
 139. See id.; see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
 140. BOB DYLAN, THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’ (Columbia Records 1964). 
 141. See Anne Krueger, Economic Growth in a Shrinking World: The IMF and 
Globalization, Address by Anne Krueger, Acting Managing Director, IMF, IMF, (June 
2, 2004) https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp060204 
[perma.cc/C7SW-VLBH]. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.  
 145. Id.  
 146. See Bone, supra note 31, at 38–39. 
 147. Id. at 25. 
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statutory reform in states like Missouri painstakingly confirm that traditional 
concepts of jurisdiction and venue must still serve as checks to the broad scope 
of joinder.  Does it make sense to keep jurisdiction and venue from developing 
and thus freeze the development of joinder? 
B.  Modern Concerns of Expansive Joinder Application Led the 
Missouri Legislature to Adopt the Holding of Burlison 
Even through the lens of corporate defendants, the ability for multiple 
plaintiffs to join in a single lawsuit dealing with a single nucleus of operative 
facts may prove to be advantageous by eliminating the need to provide 
resources for a multitude of repetitive lawsuits.148  However, corporations 
proved to be some of the most vociferous opponents to the ever-expanding 
use of joinder alongside venue in the late twentieth century and were one of 
the strongest driving forces behind tort reform.149   
An underlying concern espoused by those in the legislature and by 
business leaders was the ability for many out-of-state plaintiffs to file joint  
suits in Missouri due to broad joinder application.150  When the U.S. Chamber 
of Congress surveyed businesses in 2018 on how well they are treated by state 
courts, Missouri ranked forty-ninth.151  Governor Parson supported changing 
the standards for joinder claiming the change offers “long overdue relief to 
Missouri businesses that have been taken advantage of by rampant abuse of 
our state’s legal system.”152  
This concern of business leaders and legislators is not unsupported.  St. 
Louis has become a primary choice by many out-of-state plaintiffs in product 
liability cases.153  From 2014 to 2015, the number of petitions increased from 
around 3000 to almost 13,000 in St. Louis City courts.154  Over 140 mass tort 
claims were filed in St. Louis City in 2016, and 8900 of the plaintiffs in those 
cases had no residential ties to the city.155  Bloomberg Businessweek did not 
mince words in calling St. Louis City “a venue that over the past three years 
has developed a reputation for fast trials, favorable rulings, and big 
awards.”156  Regarding talc-based cases, the product at issue in Burlison, 
 
 148. Mary Kay Kane, Permissive Joinder of Parties under Rule 20(a) – Purpose 
and Scope, 7 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1652 (Wright & Miller eds., 3d ed. 2019). 
 149. See Geisman, supra note 86, at 182. 
 150. Missouri Lawmakers Vote to Limit Some Civil Lawsuits, supra note 2. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Philip S. Goldberg et al., The U.S. Supreme Court’s Personal Jurisdiction 
Paradigm Shift to End Litigation Tourism, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 85 
(2019). 
 154. Id. at 85–86. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Welcome to St. Louis, the New Hot Spot for Litigation 
Tourists, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, (Sept. 29, 2016) https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2016-09-29/plaintiffs-lawyers-st-louis [perma.cc/8MNG-R7E8]. 
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around two-thirds of all claims were filed in St. Louis City.157  The propensity 
for large awards seems to be meritorious, with four suits generating $300 
million in damages each.158 
Because plaintiffs’ attorneys across the country seemed to have an 
unlimited ability through the combination of the pre-Burlison loose joinder, 
venue, and jurisdiction rules to choose a particular arena for the lawsuit, they 
were able to target St. Louis as a premier forum.159  Another technological 
advancement, the ability to collect and process incredibly large sets of data, 
allowed these attorneys to develop sophisticated methods for determining 
which venues would give them the highest chances of winning a case with a 
very large damage award.160  For this issue, tort reform has proven very 
successful, reducing the disproportionate share of disputes heard by plaintiff-
friendly courts.161 
But this was not the only result of tort reform, and some of the other 
results are not so easily justified.  In Missouri, not only did the legislature’s 
action shift where lawsuits were brought, it also considerably lowered the 
amount of lawsuits brought altogether.162  Specifically, the data show the 
types of lawsuits that have seemed to disappear are those where the 
individuals do not have a strong enough financial incentive to bring any sort 
of suit against a defendant unless they have the ability to join their claim with 
others in a similar situation.163  There are certain claims that, by their nature, 
result from a large injury caused by a single defendant, but the total damages 
are diffused amongst so many plaintiffs that each individual claim is not 
economically viable for a lawsuit.  This, in fact, is the main theory behind 
allowing class actions.164  Further, some districts that were already quite 
economically strained have become even more so with an increase in tort 
filings due to geography-based venue.165  Additionally, in other areas of law 
where an individual’s claims entailed high enough damages to support 
individual cases, restrictive joinder rules ultimately led to an increase in case 
filings.166 
Therefore, there is an underlying tension between two legitimate 
concerns.  On one hand, the technological development of society has 
rendered archaic concepts of geography-based venue and joinder obsolete and 
contrary to the fundamental principles underlying the FRCP.  On the other 
 
 157. Goldberg et al., supra note 153, at 86. 
 158. Id.  
 159. See Geisman, supra note 86, at 169. 
 160. See id. at 182–83. 
 161. Id. at 181.  
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. at 175.  
 164. See Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 21, 22 (1996). 
 165. See Geisman, supra note 86, at 175. 
 166. See Dongbiao Shen, Misjoinder or Mishap? The Consequences of the AIA 
Joinder Provision, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 545, 560 (2014). 
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hand, other technological developments have developed increasingly 
sophisticated methods for choosing the perfect forum to maximize the chance 
of quick and large damages awards.  The latter seems to be winning the 
argument, as modern tort reform movements are indisputably a regression in 
the historical development of joinder and venue.  The statute enacted by the 
Missouri Legislature harkens back to the days where a blacksmith could only 
expect any dispute to arise from the community where members would buy 
his horseshoes. 
But the data do seem to indicate that joinder and venue rules, left 
unrestrained, can lead to the merits of the case being decided on a choice of 
venue rather than issues of law and fact.  Further, even if many courts would 
reach the same decision, liberal joinder rules can allow plaintiffs’ attorneys to 
isolate the location inclined to grant the largest damage award to a highly 
predictable extent.167  Procedural law serving as an effective end-all-be-all for 
substantive issues goes against even the most liberal interpretation of the 
purpose behind the FRCP.  If this legislation has similar effects as prior tort 
reforms, procedure as a substantive tool will certainly be diminished, but at 
the cost of shutting the courthouse doors to many.  Can the principle of 
broadening venue and joinder enough to adjudicate the modern dispute 
efficiently and effectively ever be balanced by the principle of venue and 
joinder not being used as substantive law? 
C.  The Net Result of Burlison and its Subsequent Legislation and 
Possible Paths Forward 
The decision in Burlison and the subsequent action by the Missouri 
Legislature do not make Missouri an outlier but rather end the practice of 
Missouri being one of the remaining stalwarts not fully abiding by recent 
United States Supreme Court rulings on personal jurisdiction.168  Both federal 
and Missouri procedural law will now, effectively, only allow multiparty 
actions to be brought in a forum where the defendant “resides.”169  This is 
because, unless all the injuries occurred in the same location, only general 
 
 167. Goldberg et al., supra note 153, at 86. 
 168. See Judicial Hellholes: City of St. Louis, Missouri, AM. TORT REFORM 
FOUND. (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.judicialhellholes.org/2018-2019/the-city-of-st-
louis-missouri/ [perma.cc/GE53-NQ72] (discussing how St. Louis courts have been 
slow to apply Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 
(2017)). The holding of Bristol-Meyers Squibb requires that personal jurisdiction not 
be used to join out of state parties when there is not a sufficient nexus between the 
actions of a defendant with that forum state. 137 S. Ct. at 1780.  The Court spoke to 
geography-based concepts of procedure, referring to the territorial limits of states over 
the defendants residing out-of-state. Id.  The only state that would have been proper 
for all the claims to be brought together would be the state of incorporation or primary 
place of business where general jurisdiction could be established. See id. at 1781. 
 169. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 
(2011); see also State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson v. Burlison, 567 S.W.3d 168, 174–
75 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). 
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jurisdiction may be utilized.170  For corporations, that would be either their 
state of incorporation or their primary place of business.171  As discussed 
above, by requiring cases to be brought in the “home-field” of corporations if 
parties are to be joined, the overall amount of lawsuits have fallen. 
The problem with tort reform efforts, such as the act passed by the 
Missouri Legislature, is that they almost always approach changes in 
procedural law by creating absolute limitations on the applications of joinder, 
venue, or personal jurisdiction.  This approach does address the underlying 
concern that venue should not be the deciding factor of a case, but the reform’s 
success is predicated on a regression of the liberal joinder application required 
to match the restorative needs of an evolving society.  Instead, if the reform 
efforts aimed to identify and eliminate the substantive differences present in 
the most troublesome districts, both seemingly conflicting rationales behind 
joinder rules could be furthered. 
As an example of a substantive difference between Missouri procedural 
law and that commonly found nationwide, a New Jersey state court 
disqualified the same experts that provided testimony for many talc cases in 
St. Louis City.172  Both federal courts and Missouri courts utilize essentially 
equivalent language for qualifying expert witnesses.173  However, Missouri 
differs from nationwide jurisdictions through a functionally different 
application of the requirement that the expert’s opinions be “the product of 
reliable principles and methods.”174  In Missouri, weaknesses in the factual 
underpinnings of an expert’s opinions or knowledge merely go to the weight 
of the testimony rather than to admissibility.175  The only way a court will 
exclude expert witness testimony is if it “is so slight as to render the opinion 
fundamentally unsupported.”176  Enacting legislation superseding this 
application may not completely remove the problem, but it would at least help 
mitigate using Missouri forums for less meritorious cases.  Further, this 
change would not serve as an inhibition for plaintiffs to seek relief in the first 
place. 
Importantly, while much of the concern espoused by the legislators in 
passing the bill was directed toward out-of-state plaintiffs, the holding in 
Burlison went further.  The holding, and now statutory language, requires that 
even each Missouri plaintiff must satisfy venue requirements.177  Because the 
venue requirements are intrinsically tied to county lines, the same regression 
of procedural values would occur even within the state.  
 
 170. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; see also Burlison, 567 S.W.3d at 174. 
 171. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924; see also Burlison, 567 S.W.3d at 181 (Draper, 
III, J., dissenting) (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.5(1) (2018)). 
 172. Goldberg et al., supra note 153, at 86. 
 173. Compare FED. R. EVID. 702 with MO. REV. STAT.  § 490.065 (2018). 
 174. § 490.065.2(1)(c). 
 175. Whitnell v. State, 129 S.W.3d 409, 414 (Mo. 2004) (en banc).  
 176. Id.  
 177. State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson v. Burlison, 567 S.W.3d 168, 171 (Mo. 2019) 
(en banc). 
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One possible way to lessen forum shopping within the state without 
making great sacrifices in judicial economy would be to enact a Missouri 
analog of Federal Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL”).178  At the federal level, if 
“civil actions involving one or more questions of fact are pending in different 
districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or 
consolidated pretrial proceedings.”179  Congress has created a judicial panel 
on MDL, and this panel assigns cases to a specific judge and district.180  Once 
discovery, pretrial motions, and other pretrial proceedings are completed, the 
various claims are then sent back to their respective districts for trial so long 
as the case is not dismissed or settled.181   
If Missouri were to pass legislation similar to federal MDL, the 
legislature could help ensure that liberal construction and application of 
joinder and venue rules do not act in a substantively dispositive manner while 
also maintaining a policy of pragmatic and efficient dispute resolution.  By 
having one court handle pretrial procedures, much of the inefficiency of 
repeating highly similar discovery and pretrial motions would be eliminated.  
But, because the cases would ultimately be sent to their respective circuits for 
trial, disparate treatment toward corporations and irregularities in damage 
awards would be mitigated.  Finally, if Missouri also enacted a panel to decide 
which judge and court would conduct the pretrial proceedings, many aspects 
of forum shopping would be taken out of the strategic hands of the parties.  
Both options showcase that there are better approaches to resolve 
conflicting policy rationales than merely choosing one that is more important 
than the other.  The historical purpose behind the development of liberal 
joinder and venue rules is clear.  It is also clear that the liberal application of 
these rules has led to procedural law being applied as substantive rules, cutting 
against its primary role of efficient and fair dispute resolution.  If a holistic 
solution is sought, a remedy, rather than mere treatment of procedural 
symptoms, is more likely to be achieved.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Joinder was designed to evolve with society: that is why a rule from 1938 
still operates effectively without a major overhaul.  Legitimate concerns have 
arisen regarding its liberal application in the modern world as contemplated 
by the reformers that brought about modern procedural thought.  However, 
restraining the progress of procedural law to inhibit its detriments is no 
different than treating the symptoms of a disease without seeking its cure.  The 
goal of tort reform – to figure out how to reduce unfair forum shopping – is a 
 
 178. See Andrew D. Bradt, Zachary D. Clopton, MDL v. Trump: The Puzzle of 
Public Law in Multidistrict Litigation, 112 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 85, 97 (2018) 
(arguing that the MDL has reduced forum shopping at the federal level). 
 179. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2018). 
 180. § 1407(b). 
 181. § 1407(a). 
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justified goal.  But procedural changes that close the courthouse doors to 
modern disputes cannot be an acceptable solution. 
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